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DAMAGES-ADDITUR AND ITS USE IN NEBRASKA 
A recent Nebraska case,1 outlining the present law on re-
mittitur, evokes a discussion of additur.2 Additur is the proce-
dural opposite of remittitur. It has been rarely invoked in Ne-
braska,3 but the possibility of its use presents a question of gen-
eral interest. 
I. HOW IS ADDITUR USED? 
On motion by the plaintiff for a new trial the judge announces 
that he will grant the motion unless the defendant agrees to the 
judge's increasing the amount of damages. If the defendant 
consents, the judge awards an increased verdict to the plaintiff 
and denies the motion for a new trial. If the defendant does not 
consent, a new trial follows as a matter of course. His consent 
is binding upon the defendant, but the plaintiff may appeal the 
order denying the new trial if he feels that the amount of the 
additur is insufficient. 
1 Peacock v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, 157 Neb. 514, 60 N.W. 2d 643 
(1953). 
2 Additur was first considered in the United States in McCoy v. Lemon, 
11 Rich. 165 (U. S. 1856), and was not allowed. It has been clearly ap-
proved in only a few cases: Morrell v. Gobeil, 84 _N.H. 150, 147 Atl. 413 
(1929); Clausing v. Kershaw, 129 Wash. 67, 224 Pac. 573 (1924); Gaff-
ney v. Illingsworth, 90 N.J.L. 490, 101 Atl. 243 (1917). 
3 Calmon v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 114 Neb. 194, 206 N.W. 765 
( 19 25). It was used because the jury had failed to allow definitely cal-
culable damages. 
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The rule pertaining to the granting of remittitur, which is 
authorized in Nebraska by statute,4 has been set out in a series 
of Nebraska cases.5 This rule might provide a framework for a 
rule governing the allowance of additur. The rule is that re-
mittitur is permitted in Nebraska only when a verdict is so clearly 
exorbitant as to indicate that it was the result of passion, pre-
judice, mistake, or some means not apparent in the record, or 
when it is clear that the jury disregarded the evidence or rules 
of law. 6 This could be made applicable to additur by substitution 
of the word "insufficient" for the word "exorbitant". 
II. WHY ADDITUR? 
The usual remedy where damages are inadequate is the setting 
aside of the verdict and the granting of a new trial.7 In most 
jurisdictions a needless retrial of all the issues can be avoided 
by limiting the retrial to the issue of damages.8 This procedure 
has been authorized by the United States Supreme Court.9 
Additur has been acclaimed, however, as a more expeditious 
process. In a state with crowded court dockets there may be a 
long delay between the time of filing a motion for a retrial and 
the date of hearing.10 Many litigants can ill afford the long wait 
4Neb. Rev. Stat.§ 25-1929 (Supp. 1953). 
5 Peacock v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, 157 Neb. 514, 60 N. W. 2d 643 
(1953); Johnson v. Schrepf, 154 Neb. 317, 47 N. W. 2d 853 (1951); 
Remmenga v. Selk, 152 Neb. 625, 42 N.W.2d 186 (1950); Erickson v. 
Morrison, 152 Neb. 133, 40 N.W.2d 413 (1950); Thoren v. l\lyers, 151 
Neb. 453, 37 N.W.2d 725 (1949); Reuger v. Hawks, 150 Neb. 834, 36 
N.W.2d 236 (1949); Horky v. Schroll, 148 Neb. 96, 26 N.W.2d 396 
(1947); Van Auker v. Steckley's Hybrid Seed Corn Co., 143 Neb. 24, 8 
N.W.2d 451 (1943). 
6 Van Aucker v. Steckley's Hybrid Seed Corn Co., 143 Neb. 24, 8 
N.W.2d 451 (1943). 
7 Goodwin v. Denato, 144 Atl. 177 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1929); Reuter v. 
Hickman, Lauson & Diener Co., 160 Wis. 284, 151 N.W. 795 (1915); 
Taylor v. Northern Electric Ry., 25 Cal. App. 765, 148 Pac. 543 (1915); 
Ferrari v. Brooks-Harrison Fuel Co., 53 Colo. 259, 125 Pac. 125 (1912); 
.A\boltin v. Heney, 62 Wash. 65, 113 Pac. 245 (1911); Anglin v. City of 
Columbus. 128 Ga. 469, 57 S.E. 780 (1907). 
s Note, 15 Va. L. Rev. 592 (1929). 
9 Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931); 
cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 (a) and Rice v. Union Pac. Ry., 82 F. Supp. 1002 (D 
Neb. 1949). 
10 Elliott, Judicial Administration 16 3 ( 19 5 3), says, "A nation-wide sur-
vey of the status of trial court calendars in 1953 shows that the overall 
average time interval from 'at issue' to trial of civil cases in the 97 met-
ropolitan courts covered was 11.5 months for jury cases and 5.7 months 
for nonjury cases." The greatest delays reported were in New York Citv 
Worcester County in Massachusetts, and Cook County, Illinois. In th~ 
Supreme Court of Kings County (Brooklyn), the average figure was 53 
months, and in New York County (Manhattan), 43 months. 
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and many settle out of court for sums substantially less than they 
could have received had the case gone before a jury. Additur 
eliminates the delay, pares expenses, and provides an end to the 
litigation. 
Expendiency and the interests of the average litigant thus 
form a persuasive argument for the use of additur. Yet there 
are problems connected with its use. 
III. CONSTITUTION.AL PROBLEMS 
One of the vexing problems is that of constitutionality. In 
the case of Dimick v. Schiedt11 a five justice majority of the 
United States Supreme Court held the use of additur in the fed-
eral courts unconstitutional.12 The Court reasoned that additur 
violated the Seventh Amendment by substituting the opinion of 
the court on the question of damages for that of the jury. 
Remittitur was also condemned, but the Court did not declare 
it to be unconstitutional, probably because remittitur had become 
too solidly entrenched in American law to be overruled. The 
Court therefore distinguished between remittitur and additur, 
stating that the jury passed on all lesser sums when setting the 
amount of damages, but did not pass upon greater sums. 
The Court stated that only those practices known at common 
law at the time of the passage of the Seventh Amendment were 
acceptable under its terms. Additur had been occasionally used 
in England prior to 1791, mostly in cases of mayhem,13 but had 
fallen into disuse at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. 
It has since been expressly condemned by the English courts.14 
In a strong dissent the minority cited precedent to show that 
the Seventh Amendment was not meant to perpetuate all the 
minute procedural details of the common law, but was merely 
intended to preserve the essentials of jury trial and to safeguard 
the jury's function from encroachments not permitted by the com-
11293 U.S. 474 (1935). 
12 U.S. Const. Amend. VII provides, "In suits at common law, where 
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules 
of common law". 
13 Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. Va. L.Q. 1 (1942). The 
practice, known as super visum vulneris, was used when the court, upon 
viewing the wound, might grant extra damages. 
14 Watt v. Watt, [1905] A.C. 115. 
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mon law.16 No procedure is therefore forbidden if it does not 
curtail the power of the jury to decide facts as it would have be-
fore the adoption of the amendment. 
It seems that here the minority has posed a dilemma and has 
been impaled on its horns. In discussing additur and remittitur 
the minority stated: 
In neither case does the jury return a verdict for the amount 
actually recovered, and in both the amount of the recovery is 
fixed, not by the verdict, but by the consent of the party resisting 
the motion for a new trial.16 
It must be noted that the opinion of the minority itself infers 
that additur does not allow the jury to find the fact of what 
the amount of the verdict should be.17 
Since the Seventh Amendment has not been incorporated into 
the Fourteenth, Dimick v. Schiedt applies only to Federal 
Courts. As far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, state 
courts are free to allow or disallow additur as they choose. 
State constitutions ordinarily do not contain provisions simi-
lar to the Seventh Amendment but simply provide that the right 
of trial by jury should remain inviolate.18 Thus state courts need 
not determine whether additur is a re-examination of a fact tried 
by a jury. 
Nebraska's constitution provides that the right to trial by 
jury should remain inviolate;19 this has been determined to mean 
nothing more than a declaration of the common law as to the 
mode of trial.20 Therefore additur probably could constitutionally 
be used in Nebraska. 
Additur might be utilized when the amount of damages is 
liquidated and certain, or when the amount of damages could be 
15 Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co. 283 U.S. 494 (1931), 
followed in Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943). 
16 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 494 (1935). 
17 For a thorough discussion of this point see Schiedt v. Dimick, 70 F.2d 
528 (1st Cir. 1934). 
18 44 Yale L.J. 319 ( 1934). 
19 Neb. Const. Art. I, § 2 provides: "The right of trial by jury shall 
remain inviolate, but the legislature may authorize trial by a jury of a 
less number than twelve in courts inferior to the district court, and may 
by general law authorize a verdict in civil cases in any court by not less 
than five-sixths of the jury." 
20 Omaha Fire Insurance Co. v. Thompson, 50 Neb. 580, 70 N.W. 30 
(1897). 
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determined by fixed rules of law. In such situations the1·e could 
be no question of a usurpation of the task of the jury. 
Wisconsin follows a unique practice, allowing additur in 
cases where the damages are uncertain, provided that the de-
fendant will consent to such a large increase that any further 
increase would wan-ant the court's setting aside the same amount 
as excessive.21 
CONCLUSION 
Since the use of additur is open in Nebraska and its ex-
pendiency is conceded, it is submitted that additur should be 
used in cases where damages can clearly be determined. 
The shadow of deprivation of the right to jury trial is heavy 
enough, however, that additur would be a quite questionable de-
vice if used where the amount of damages is uncertain. It is 
an unquestionable fact that when unliquidated damages are in-
volved the use of additur means the substitution of the judgment 
of the court for the judgment of the jury. When such substitu-
tion occurs, it is impossible to contend that the jury has tried the 
issue of damages. In such cases there has been a deprivation of 
the right to trial by jury. 
James W. Hewitt, '56. 
21 Reuter v. Hickman, Lauson & Diener Co., 160 Wis. 284, 151 N.W. 
795 (1915). 
